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A long standing question in macroeconomics is whether the business cycle is 
endogenously or exogenously generated, with the majority of the profession 
having been inclined towards the latter position. This is particularly the case in 
recent years given the proliferation of work on real business cycles which rely 
on technology shocks, even though these models have been subjected to serious 
criticism from within mainstream economics. Kingman (1994), for example, 
describes the approach as being ‘deeply implausible’, and a number of papers 
(eg: Cogley and Nason (1995), Eichenbaum (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1996) and Watson (1993)) have drawn attention to the fact that real business 
cycle models appear to be unable to generate key time-series properties of post­
war American business cycle data.
Many economists supportive of the real business cycle approach may 
sympathise with the sentiments of Wickens (1995): ‘For many the appeal of 
Keynesian economics over neoclassical economics is the supposed greater 
realism of its assumptions. We all know that markets are not complete, that 
people are not rational, make myopic decisions and lack full information, that 
one agent is different from another, and that a model built on microeconomic 
foundations cannot be aggregated to the level of conventional macroeconomic 
variables. The problem is that building models with these features is virtually an 
intractable problem’.
In this paper, we develop a model with many of these features. It is a 
microeconomic model of short-term output growth based upon interacting, 
heterogeneous individual agents operating under uncertainty on Keynesian 
principles. The aggregate output growth series which emerges from their 
activities has time-series properties which, on a wide range of criteria, are very 
similar to the cyclical properties of post-war US GNP growth.
It is not necessary to invoke any form of exogenous shock in the model, 
and the cycle is purely endogenous, essentially arising from the existence of 
heterogenous agents operating under uncertainty.
Section 2 of the paper sets out the economic basis of the model, and 
Section 3 describes the simulation properties of the model, particularly with 
respect to comparisons with actual American output data. The Appendix 
outlines technical details of how the simulations are carried out. Section 4 of the 



























































































2. The microeconomic model of interacting Keynesian agents
All the agents in our model are companies, which is very much in keeping with 
Keynes’s view that the primary source of fluctuations over the course of the 
business cycle is the corporate sector.
The model is populated by heterogeneous individual companies operating 
under uncertainty. Each individual firm decides its own rate of growth of output 
and its own rate of change of sentiment about the future. The model evolves in 
discrete time steps, and in each of these steps (periods) the majority of agents 
update their previous decisions on output and sentiment.
A key feature of the model is that firms interact with each other by taking 
account of the decisions of other companies in their own decisions on the output 
and sentiment variables. In general equilibrium theory, agents’ tastes are given, 
and they react indirectly via the price mechanism to the actions of others. But in 
our model, the preferences of each agent are not fixed, but are altered directly 
by observing the behaviour of others.
The key question which every firm must decide during any particular 
period is the rate of growth of the output which it will produce in the next 
period. Once this decision has been made, the firm is stuck with it. When in the 
process of time the company arrives in this next period, it is allowed to decide a 
different growth rate for the period afterwards, but not to revise the previous 
decision on this period’s growth. Obviously, this is somewhat artificial, but it is 
not completely unreasonable. For in the very short-run, there are often 
substantial costs involved in altering previous decisions about how much to 
produce. Contracts have been placed with suppliers, the workforce has been 
alerted as to how much effort will be needed, indeed employees may have been 
either taken on or sacked depending upon the circumstances, the marketing 
programme will be committed, and so on and so forth.
In these circumstances, agents act according to a straightforward rule in 
order to decide how quickly output should either be expanded or contracted in 
the next period. They are very short-sighted, and look no further ahead than 
this. In other words, they are satisficers and not maximisers.
One factor which weighs in a company’s decision on how much to alter 
the amount produced in the next period is the rate of growth at which output is 
actually changing during the current period. There are costs and difficulties of 
altering the amount which a firm is producing by large amounts, whether up or 




























































































But, in addition and more importantly, in deciding the rate at which its 
own output is to change in the next period, each firm pays great attention to the 
general level of sentiment, the degree of optimism or pessimism, about the 
future, and how this is changing. This is very much in the spirit of Keynes, who 
set great store on the role of expectations and the general level of confidence in 
determining the outcome of the economy, both in the short-run and, through 
decisions on investment, in the longer-term.
In terms of the formal model, we let X,(t) be the growth rate of output of 
agent i at time t, and XBAR(t) the overall growth of output of the population at 
time t, weighted according to the sizes of the agents. In other words, XBAR(t) is 
simply the weighted sum of the individual Xj(t).
The degree of optimism or pessimism about output growth in the future 
held by the i’th agent at time t is given by YjS(t), and the (weighted) aggregate of 
these individual decisions by YBARs(t).
We use the superscript ‘s’ to stand for ‘sentiment’ to emphasise that it is 
not the conventional concept of expectations. The Y,*(t) should be thought of as 
expressing sentiment (optimism/pissimism) about change in the future, rather 
than being based in some sense on ‘optimal’ forecasts of the rate of growth of 
output at some specific point in the future. Keynes himself was deeply sceptical 
about the latter approach, arguing that ‘our existing knowledge does not provide 
a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expression’.
In each time period, any firm can in principle decide to change its 
previous rate of growth of output, Xj(t -  1). The growth rate of output of agent i 
in this period is based on a combination of the firm’s output growth in the 
previous period, and the aggregate sentiment in the previous period about future 
output growth, i.e.
(1 -  a ) Xj(t -  1) + a  YBARs(t -  1) (I)
This represents the rate of growth in the absence of any circumstances which 
are particular to agent i. The interaction between individual agents takes place 
through the YBAR variable, so that the sentiment of other agents about the rate 
of growth of output in the future affects the decision on the rate of growth of 
output taken by agent i.
An implication of (3) is that firms feel that there are constraints which 
operate on their output decisions. It is the aggregate state of sentiment, which 




























































































Journal, which is a determinant of any revision to the growth of output of the 
ith agent. In other words, companies feel that, for example, demand may be a 
limiting factor on them in the future, and that one way of trying to judge the 
likely state of demand is via aggregate sentiments about growth in the future.
The general level of business optimism or pessimism about the future is 
inescapably linked with uncertainty, which in tum leads to the important 
property of the model that the individual agents each take different decisions at 
any point in time.. Given the existence of uncertainty about the future and the 
fact that the agents are heterogenous, each agent may interpret any given level 
or change in overall sentiment about the future differently, in other words may 
draw more or less optimistic conclusions from any given value of YBARs(t-1).
We do not require that any individual agent is consistently more or less 
optimistic than any other over time with respect to these interpretations, but 
simply that at each point in time, because of uncertainty, agents differ. In terms 
of the YBAR5 variable, there may also be a secondary source of uncertainty. 
Despite the large amount of information about sentiment available in the 
financial media, there is no single, published measure of YBARS at any point in 
time, so firms may be uncertain, and hence differ in their intepretations, about 
the level of YBARS at time (t-1).
In short, uncertainty means that each heterogenous agent operates in a 
different way to every other. There is uncertainty at any point in time about the 
precise level of business sentiment about the future. And there is uncertainty 
about what any perceived level of sentiment means for decisions by any 
particular firm about what its rate of growth of output should be in the period 
immediately ahead.
This is introduced formally into the model by modifying equation (1). 
The growth rate of agent i is set according to
Xi(t) = (1 -  a )  Xi(t -  1) + a  {YBAR'ft -  1) + Ei(t)} (2) 
where E|(t) is a random variable with mean zero and variance V|.
It is important to note, even at the risk of over-emphasising the point, that 
in each time period companies do not share the same E. The variable £ is not a 
degree of uncertainty which is common to all firms, but each firm in each period 
has its own E. In other words, E must not be regarded as a common, exogenous 




























































































The sentiment of the ith agent about the rate of growth of output in the 
future is derived on similar principles, which can be discussed more briefly. In 
the absence of circumstances particular to agent i, its sentiment is a simple 
function of the ith agent’s sentiment in the previous period, and of the aggregate 
rate of growth of output in the previous period.
(1 -  (3) Y,s(t -  1) -  p X B A R ( t - l )  (3)
This differs from (3) in that there is a minus sign in front of the aggregate 
variable, XBAR. Other things being equal, the faster that aggregate output 
grows, the more pessimistic become sentiments about future output growth. 
This follows from Keynes’s own definition of the business cycle, or what he 
called the trade cycle in chapter 22 of the General Theory:
‘By a cyclical movement we mean that as the system progresses in, e.g.. the upward 
direction, the forces propelling it upwards at first gather force and have a cumulative 
effect on one another but gradually lose their strength until at a certain point they tend 
to be replaced by forces operating in the opposite direction; which in tum gather force 
for a time and accentuate one another, until they too, having reached their maximum 
development, wane and give place to their opposite’.
A mathematical approximation to this description is, of course, that of a simple 
oscillator, and hence the negative sign on XBAR(t - 1) in (3).
Interaction between agents takes place in (3) through the XBAR term. 
The decisions of all other agents on the rate of growth if output influences the 
sentiment of the ith agent about the rate of growth in the future.
Heterogeneity of agents is again introduced, by allowing agents to differ 
at any point in time on their interpretations of what any given value of XBAR 
actually implies. The sentiment formed about the rate of growth of output of 
agent i in the current period is therefore given by
Y,s(t) = (1 -  P) Y,s( t -  1) -  P- {XBAR(t -  1) + r|i(t)) (4)
where r\,(t)} is a random variable with mean zero and variance v2.
Again, it is important to note that in each period each firm has its own 





























































































In summary, our model comprises equations (2) and (4)
X,(t) = ( 1 -  a ) X,(t -  1 ) + a  {YBARs(t -  1 ) + E,(t)} (2)
Y,s(t) = (1 -  p) YjS(t -  1 ) -  p ( XBAR(t -  1 ) + T|,(t) ) ( 4 )
The key economic content of the modH is the assumption that agents are 
heterogenous, which given the existence of uncertainty leads to them behaving 
differently. This can be seen as follows. Suppose we removed this aspect of the 
model, and worked instead with equations (1) and (3). Setting the sum of the 
weights used on individual agents equal to 1, these can be re-written as a simple 
pair of difference equations in XBAR and YB ARS:
The dynamics of this system of equations can be analysed quite readily by 
forming a matrix of its parameters and calculating the eigenvalues. For most 
economically meaningful pairs of values of a  and P (ie: 0 < a.p  <l). the 
eigenvalues are complex but with real parts which lie between zero and one. 
Therefore the system of equations given by 5(a) and (b) gives rise in general to 
damped oscillations. It is the existence of uncertainty and the consequent 
introduction of the terms Ej(t) and rj,(t) into equations (2) and (4) which gives to 
the model a pattern of behaviour which is quite distinct from this.
The model we actually use, namely equations (2) and (4), is still, rather 
obviously, a dramatic simplification of reality. Two potential extensions spring 
to mind quite readily. First, each firm plans its rate of growth of output for the 
forthcoming period on the basis of (2) and, implicitly, carries out this plan 
regardless of the market conditions which actually obtain. These plans might 
prove to be unwarranted, but the model does not include any mechanism 
whereby the agent takes account of this in making decisions about the 
subsequent period.
Second, it would undoubtedly be more realistic to introduce some local 
interaction into the model. At present, interaction between agents takes place 
solely by the reference each agent makes to the global outcome, whether of 
sentiment or of output. In practice, firms may pay special attention to the 
decisions of a sub-group of other agents, sue i as those within its own industry, 
or those to whom the firm is a major supplier. Such local interactions could
XBAR(t) = (1 -  a)X B A R (t-l) + aYBARs( t- l ) (5a)




























































































possibly be based upon the same principles as those which Kirman (1991, for 
example) has pioneered.
But, despite its simplicity, the model does capture many of the aspects of 
economic behaviour which are usually associated with Keynesianism and, as we 
shall see, its solutions have properties which are very similar to those of actual 
business cycle data, without having to invoke exogenous shocks of any kind.
3. Model simulations and business cycle data
In this section, we compare the properties of simulations of our model with 
those of the actual data series on quarterly US real GNP growth over the period 
1947Q2 through 1990Q4, used, for example, by Potter (1995). Technical details 
of the simulations are set out in the Appendix.
The simulations are made over 175 periods, to give data series of the 
same length as the actual US output growth data examined by Potter. The 
results we present are, in general, summaries of a total number of 1000 
simulations, each carried out over 175 periods.
Our interest is in cyclical fluctuations in growth, and so the model 
solutions are compared with actual growth net of its mean value. (The actual 
data are seasonally adjusted. It would be very easy to introduce a seasonal 
element to our model, but this would not add in any meaningful way to its 
economic content).
Figure la plots the actual data, net of the mean, and Figure lb a typical 
model simulation of the growth of output variable. Simple inspection shows 































































































Real quarterly US GNP growth, net of mean
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Time 
Figura la
Output growth variable In typical simulation
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Time 
Figure 1b
In the first instance, we discuss the ranges over which both the aggregate output 
growth and the output growth of individual agents typically move, and examine 
the typical correlations between the rates of growth of output of individual 
agents over time. We then move on to discuss the time-series properties of the 
aggregate output growth variable.
Table 1 sets out the summary statistics for actual growth and for the 
average of the output growth variable, XBAT., in a 1000 simulations.
Table 1. Summary statistics of real US GNP growth (net of its mean) and 
the average of 1,000 model simulations
Real US GNP growth Simulated growth
Minimum -0.0317 -0.0291
1 st quartile -0.0066 -0.0074
3rd quartile 0.0063 0.0073
Maximum 0.0321 0.0290




























































































There are two aspects of the simulations which concern the results for 
individual agents. The first of these points can be dealt with briefly. The 
aggregate output growth variable in the simulations moves within a typical 
range of around -0.03 to +0.03. The range for the typical individual agent is 
larger, but not dramatically so, being from -0.09 to +0.09, which seems 
realistic.
In terms of the second point to make, the model is set up with each of the 
agents representing a company and taking decisions on short-term output 
growth, so in its present form the relative volatility of various economy wide 
aggregates such as consumption and investment is not available.
However, a widely accepted property of business cycles is that output 
changes across broadly defined sectors move together over time. In its present, 
basic form, our model does not lend itself to an obvious aggregation of agents 
into groups representing, say, the car or alcohol producing industries. Any such 
aggregation would be purely artificial. A possible extension to the model would 
be to set it up with such sectors, using stochastic graph theory. But with the 
current model we can examine the cross-correlations in output growth between 
each of the agents in the population, and these are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of cross-correlations between the period-by-period 







In other words, there is, almost universally, positive and statistically 
highly significant correlations between the period-by-period growth of output of 
individual firms. The correlations are relatively small, but this seems entirely 
realistic. For example, although firms within the same industrial sector will be 
affected in similar ways by developments in the aggregate economy, much of 
their marketing activity is devoted to struggles with their direct competitors 
over market share, which can and does fluctuate. So correlation of the short-run 




























































































Our main interest, however, is to compare time-series properties of actual 
US data and of the aggregate growth of output variable, XBAR. Real business 
cycle models have been criticised strongly in the recent literature for their 
inability to replicate key qualitative features of cyclical movements of the actual 
data. Examples of such criticism are Cogley and Nason (1995), Eichenbaum 
(1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Watson (1993).
There are two serious shortcomings of real business cycle models in this 
context. Both the autocorrelation function and the spectral properties of their 
simulated data are quite different from those of the actual data (though given 
that the power spectrum is the Fourier transform pair of the autocorrelation 
function, it is not surprising that deficiencies in one of these aspects is reflected 
in the other).
The simulated data from RBC models is qualitatively different from the 
actual American data. The actual data has low order positive autocorrelation, 
and then negative but insignificant autocorrelation at higher order. Simulations 
of RBC models, as noted for example by Cogley and Nason (op.cit.) produce 
data which is either complete white noise or is negatively autocorrelated at 
almost every lag.
In terms of its spectral properties, actual data has a power spectrum which 
is concentrated at the frequencies which correspond to those of the business 
cycle, noted by Cogley and Nason, for example, to be between 2.33 and 7 years 
per cycle, with maximum power of the spectrum at roughly 3.2 years per cycle. 
In general, RBC simulated data has a flat power spectrum, indicating that 
business cycle components are no more important than components of any other 
frequency.
We compare both the ACF and the power spectrum of our simulated data 
with that of actual data.
The first two autocorrelation coefficients of the actual quarterly data over 
the 1947-1990 period are 0.37 and 0.25 respectively, both of which are 
significantly different from zero on the usual criteria, given that an 
approximation to the standard error on the coefficients is 1/Vn, where n is the 
sample size. The third coefficient has a point estimate of 0.01, and the 
coefficients at four through eight lags are negative but insignificant.
The ACF of the actual data and the average of the ACFs of the simulated 
data are plotted in Figure 2. The simulated data clearly replicates qualitatively 




























































































autocorrelation at higher lags. Over the first 8 lags, the coefficients of the ACF 
of actual data sum to 0.27. and those of simulated data to 0.29.
Autocorrelation function of actual and simulated data
We do not attempt to disguise the fact that the quantitative estimates do 
not match perfectly, with, for example, the average coefficient of the simulated 
data at lag one being 0.61 compared to the 0.37 of the actual data, and 0.12 at 
lag two compared to 0.25. On the formal test proposed by Cogley and Nason, 
the null hypothesis that the actual and simulated ACFs are identical is rejected. 
But the simulated data captures the decisive qualitative feature of low order 
positive and higher order negative autocorrelation in a way which RBC models 
simply do not.
Figure 3 plots the smoothed periodogram of the actual data and of a 
typical simulation (the calculations are performed in the statistical package S- 
Flus, with a split cosine taper being applied to the end points of the data, and a 
mild amount of smoothing being applied to the raw periodogram through 




























































































Smoothed periodogram: actual and typical simulation
The spectrums of both the actual and simulated data are both 
concentrated at frequencies which correspond to those of the business cycle, 
with the simulated being somewhat more concentrated than the actual. But 
again, as with the ACF, the simulated data reflects clearly the qualitative 
properties of the actual data.
The degree of concentration of the data at business cycle frequencies is, 
however, not strong. An important reason why this is the case was advanced 
many years ago by Bums and Mitchell (1946), in their classic NBER work on 
the US business cycle, who argued that ‘the sequence of changes is recurrent 
but not periodic; in duration cycles vary from more than one year to ten or 
twelve years’.
In summary, unlike real business cycle models, our simple model 
replicates the main qualitative features of actual US output growth. It is 
deliberately parsimonious in its structure, but nevertheless the calibrations of 





























































































4. Implications for unemployment policy
As a first approximation, we assume that unemployment is determined by the 
state of aggregate demand. In other words, it depends upon thr rate of growth of 
output. This is contrary to the received wisdom in economics, which sees 
unemployment as being determined primarily by supply side factors such as the 
benefit/wage ratio and general labour market ‘flexibility’. It is recognised by 
most economists, however, that during the course of a single business cycle, 
unemployment is correlated with movements in output. But, as Nickell (1997i 
for example argues, it is believed that ‘business cycle effects and autonomous 
demand shocks of various kinds should wash out if we take a long enough 
period’.
On the contrary, the evidence of the past two decades or so in Western 
economies is that a substantial amount of the increase in unemployment which 
has taken place can be accounted for by an inadequate growth in demand which 
has persisted over the course of several cycles.
In the standard Layard-Nickell approach, for example, demand plays no 
role in determining unemployment over time .dthough Rowthom (1996) shows 
absolutely conclusively that this relies upon making an assumption which is 
contradicted by the empirical evidence, namely that the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour equals one.
Essentially, Layard-Nickell models take international evidence on 
unemployment, and relate it to a number of factors such as the benefit system 
and a set of country-group dummies. The variables on ‘centralised wage 
bargaining’ and such are of this latter kind: they say that a group of countries 
with particular characteristics in common have a different experience of 
unemployment than countries in other groups.
In the same spirit, we examine the hypothesis that the change in the 
average rate of unemployment in 20 OECD economies between the periods 
1974-94 and 1960-73 depends simply upon the change in the average annual 
rate of growth. The change in unemployment depends simply on the change in 
the rate of growth. But, in the spirit of Layard-Nickell, we have some country 
groups. We have the corporatist economies of Austria and Switzerland - very 
centralised in many ways, which expelled foreigners; socially cohesive 
economies of Sweden and Portugal; and the special social cohesive case of 
Japan. We test the hypothesis that the change in these economies is - for 




























































































change in growth. This is just what Layard-Nickell models do with their 
dummies for different types of wage bargaining, and is equally justified.
This is the resulting regression:
DU = -0.17 - 2.18DG - 11.89JDUM - 4.86COHDUM
(0.89) (0.35) (1.95) (1.14)
- 5.21CORPDUM (6)
( 1. 10)
s.e. = 1.43; R2 = 0.799
where the figures in brackets are standard errors, DU is the change in average 
unemployment rate 1974-94 on 1960-73 in 20 countries, DG is the change in 
the growth rate; and there are three dummy variables as discussed above, which 
are signed in accordance with prior expectations.
This suggests that the change in growth accounts for 80 per cent of the 
change in unemployment. And for every peicentage point fall in a country's 
growth rate, unemployment was some 2.2 percentage points higher.
We now move to consider the implications of our model for 
unemployment in terms of the properties of the aggregate growth of output 
variable, XBAR(t).
A very important implication is that what has come to be seen as 
‘Keynesian’ demand management, in the sense of following counter-cyclical 
demand policies, cannot succeed. In order to be able to carry out effective 
counter-cyclical policy, it is necessary to be able to make forecasts which on 
average are reasonably accurate. Unless the state of demand in, say, a year’s 
time can be predicted with reasonable confidence, it is not possible to decide the 
appropriate counter-cyclical policy to carry out now.
But the properties of both the XBAR variable in the model and of actual 
output growth suggest that forecasts cannot be carried out with any meaningful 
degree of accuracy even over a one-year ahead horizon. This is demonstrated 
for both the actual and simulated data using techniques of phase space attractor 
reconstruction by Ormerod and Campbell (1997) and Ormerod (1998), to which 
the interested reader is referred. It should be said that this is entirely consistent 
with the actual macro-economic forecasting record. The OECD (1993), for 




























































































government, the IMF and the OECD, and concluded that they were no better 
than the naive rule that next year’s growth is the same as this year’s, a rule 
which leads to a very poor forecasting record.
But even if forecasts could be made with sufficient degree of accuracy to 
warrant an attempt at a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, the conventional literature 
gives little guide as to the appropriate policies to follow. Church et.al. (1993). 
for example, report the policy simulation properties of the six leading UK 
macro-econometric models. The models disagree not just on the size but on the 
sign of the conventional public expenditure multiplier in the medium term.
Consider the impact in our model of short-term government fiscal 
intervention. We can interpret this as an exogenous shock to the outcome which 
the model itself would generate.
We examined the impact of a large contractionary intervention amounting 
to a negative impact of 5 percentage points in each of four successive periods. 
The miervention was assumed to operate in two different ways. First, the impact 
was purely on the aggregate output variable. Second, the impact was on both the 
aggregate output and the aggregate sentiment variable.
We carried out 200 simulations of the model in each case, and the results 
are reported in Table 3. We show summary statistics for the rate of growth of 
aggregate output in the year (assuming the periods are quarters) in which the 
intervention takes place, and over the five years after the intervention.
Table 3. Output growth (%) following negative fiscal intervention of 5 
percentage points of aggregate output
Shock to aggregate output only 
Min 3rd Quartile Mean 1st quartile Max
Year of intervention -6.1 -4.6 -4.1 -3.6 - 2.0
Next five years - 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0
Shock to aggregate output and aggregate 
Min 3rd Quartile Mean 1st quartile
sentiment
Max
-4.8Year of intervention -9.0 -7.6 -7.1 -6.5




























































































By construction, in the long-term the average rate of growth of output in 
simulations of the model is zero, for the model is concerned with cycles around 
the underlying long-run growth rate. So the results must be interpreted bearing 
this in mind.
There are several points to make. First, expectations and sentiment are 
important in determining the size of the short-term multiplier. A negative shock 
of 5 percentage points to aggregate output alone gives an average multiplier of 
4.1/5 = 0.82, whereas if sentiment is also affected negatively by the shock the 
multiplier is 7.1/5 = 1.42. Second, the estimated size of the multiplier varies 
according to the state of the economy at the time. When both output and 
sentiment are affected, for example, the impact multiplier varies between 0.96 
and 1.80.
But the third point is the most important for our present purposes. 
Namely, that the long-run impact of temporary fiscal shocks is essentially zero. 
The average rate of growth in the five years following the shock is effectively 
zero. In other words, conventional fiscal policy cannot succeed in altering the 
longer-term outcome for output and hence for employment.
Governments can influence the rate of growth of output and hence the 
level of employment/unemployment in the longer run, but only if they are able 
to create an environment in which the state of sentiment about the future is 
made more optimistic than it would otherwise be in a sustained way. Table 4 
illustrates the effect on aggregate output growth of a sustained positive shock 
over twenty years of one percentage point to the aggregate sentiment variable.
Table 4. Output growth (%) following sustained positive shock of one 
percentage point over 20 years to aggregate sentiment
Min 3rd Quartile Mean 1st quartile Max
0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9
Economists offering advice to policy-makers have been accustomed to 
provide a check-list: ‘do A, B and C, and the consequences will be X’. As our 
model shows, such an approach can be seriously misleading. However, it is hard 





























































































But we can think of the immediate post-war years as a good illustration of 
the benefits which arise whenever governments are able to create a positive 
environment in which sentiment about the future is boosted. After the war. there 
was enormous supply side potential for growth. In Europe in particular, 
personal consumer spending had been rationed severely for a number of years. 
There was a pent-up backlog of demand which could, and did. translate itself 
into a willingness to buy almost anything which was produced. Companies 
knew this, so their overall level of optimism was potentially high. They had the 
confidence to invest, which further boosted orders, growth and fed back 
positively on confidence itself. And, on the Continent in particular, a great deal 
of the capital stock of industry had been destroyed and needed replacing. The 
skills of the workforce remained intact, and in many ways were enhanced by the 
experience of war-time production. Overall, everything was in place on the 
supply-side to generate the very rapid rates of growth which were observed in 
the 1950s and for much of the 1960s.
Yet things could have gone seriously wrong. The initial transition of the 
European countries out of their war economies was hampered by a shortage of 
finance, and in particular of foreign exchange to pay for imports. The 
extraordinary generosity and far-sightedness of the American Marshall Plan was 
a key factor in overcoming this potentially serious hurdle. Perhaps even more 
importantly, recipients of funds in the Plan had to commit themselves to the 
principle of the market economy, and to dismantle the extensive planning and 
control structures assembled during the war. Such a framework can mobilise 
resources successfully during a crisis, but, as the experience of the Soviet bloc 
shows only too clearly, eventually proves stultifying.
The international world order could have retreated, as it did so 
disastrously after the First World War, into protectionism and monetary 
disorder. But again, mainly due to America’s ability to impose its will, a process 
of dismantling trade barriers was set in motion, and the Bretton Woods 
agreement imposed order on the world money markets.
This environment created a virtuous circle, in which cycles existed 
around a level of expectations and sentiment which by historical standards was 
high. It is this for which governments should aim if they are to have a sustained 





























































































In this paper, we develop a microeconomic model of short-term output growth 
based upon interacting, myopic, heterogeneous individual agents operating on 
Keynesian principles.
The individual agents represent firms which differ in size, and are 
heterogeneous with respect both to decisions on output and to sentiment about 
future output growth. The decisions on the output growth of each agent are 
influenced by aggregate sentiment about the growth of output in the future, so 
that the decisions of others affects directly the behaviour of each agent. The 
sentiment on future output growth of each agent depends upon the previous 
value of his or her sentiment, and on the aggregate rate of growth of output. 
Again, through this latter term the decisions of other agents affects directly the 
behaviour of each individual agent.
We compare the properties of the output of 1,000 simulations of the 
model over 175 periods with that of the post-war US real quarterly GNP growth 
over the same number of periods, net of its mean. The model is calibrated so 
that the output growth variable has the same range of movement as that of the 
actual data.
A widely accepted property of business cycles is that output changes 
across broadly defined sectors move together over time. In its present, basic 
form, our model does not lend itself to an obvious aggregation of agents into 
groups representing different sectors. But the correlations between the growth 
rates of output of the individual agents in our model are generally positive and 
substantially different from zero, a result which is compatible with this 
particular stylised fact about business cycles.
The recent literature shows that the simulated data of real business cycle 
models does not replicate two key features of US short-term growth, namely the 
existence of significant positive autocorrelation at low order lags and then 
negative but insignificant autocorrelation at higher order lags, and the 
concentration of the power spectrum at frequencies which correspond to those 
of the business cycle.
In contrast to RBC models, our Keynesian model of interacting micro­




























































































Moreover, our model does not rely in any way on exogenous shocks. The 
cyclical behaviour which it exhibits in aggregate arises endogenously from the 
interaction of individual agents at the micro-level.
Our model is obviously a drastic simplification of reality. But the 
interaction of individual agents operating on Keynesian principles produces, 
endogenously to the model, a series for aggregate output growth whose 
qualitative properties are very similar to those of post-war US quarterly GNP 
growth.
Despite the Keynesian nature of the micro-foundations of the model, it 
provides little or no support for the idea that conventional counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy can affect the level of employment and unemployment in the 
medium term. The short-term multiplier of fiscal intervention varies very 
substantially, depending upon whether or not it succeeds in shocking aggregate 
sentiment and upon the state of the economy at the time of the intervention. But 
in the medium-term, the fiscal multiplier is zero.
The model allows the rale of growth of output, and hence the demand for 
labour, to be increased in the medium term if governments are able to create an 
overall environment, as they did in the immediate post-war years, in which the 
aggregate state of sentiment about the future is sustained at a level higher than it 




























































































Appendix: Technical details of model simulations
In order to produce model simulations, we have to decide upon the number of 
agents in the population and their relative sizes, and upon the parameters a, p, 
V| and v2 which appear in equations (2) and (4).
The qualitative properties of the model are very similar to those reported 
in the main text of the paper if we make the assumption that all agents are the 
same size, but it is more realistic to allow firm size to differ. We choose the 
relative sizes of the agents in accordance with evidence from the US Fortune 
500. In 1994 the top 10 companies had total sales slightly greater than those of 
the companies ranked 101-200 by size, and the top 100 had total sales quite 
considerably larger than those ranked 101-500. Although the everyday concept 
of sales is not the same as the definition of output in the national accounts, it 
does not seem unreasonable to choose the sizes of the agents in our model 
according to the power law which describes the distribution of the Fortune 500 
companies by size
log(sales)= 12.757 -  0.7891og(n) (7)
(0.0053)
where n is the rank of the firms by size, the figure in brackets is the standard 
error on the coefficient, and the R: of the equation is 0.978. The power law (7) 
can be used to generate populations of any required size.
In principle, there is an argument for using very large populations, but we 
make the economic assumption that the overall behaviour of the corporate 
sector of any developed market economy is well described by the actions of the 
500 largest companies.
In terms of parameter values, there is a fairly strong economic case that, 
in order to reflect the Keynesian spirit of the model, a  should be reasonably 
close to 1. In other words, decisions on output growth are mainly governed by 
sentiment about the future. There is less economic guidance on the choice of p, 
but after some initial experimentation we settled on values of a  = 0.80 and P = 
0.275.
The parameters V[ and v2 were chosen (with values 0.025 and 0.10 
respectively) in order to give the aggregate output variable, XBAR, a similar 
range to that of actual quarterly American post-war output growth. These two 
parameters simply affect the range of XBAR and YBARS and make no 




























































































scale. For convenience, we assumed that the terms e , and rj, in equations (2) and 
(4) respectively follow a normal distribution, though in principle any reasonable 
statistical distribution could be used.
Simulations of the model are obtained as follows. At the outset values for 
X| and YjS are chosen at random from an appropriate normal distribution. An 
agent is chosen at random to update its growth rate and another agent is chosen 
to update its expectation or sentiment. This step is then repeated a number of 
times.
The theoretical model does not have a well defined time scale, so we 
define the period of the model to consist of 800 such steps. The aggregate 
variables XBAR and YBAR5 are re-calculated only after this number of updates 
by individual agents. The choice of 800 steps to define the period means that 
the probability of any individual firm not revising its output decision is simply 
((500 -  l)/500)800, which is approximately 0.20. In other words, around one- 
fifth of firms do not revise growth rates during any given period, and four-fifths 
do so revise. The qualitative properties of the simulations are similar for choices 
of between 500 and 1000 steps, which imply respectively that around one-third 
and one-eighth of companies do not revise decisions during any given period.
We introduced a facility whereby the revisions of the agents become 
known immediately to the other agents during that same period, by updating the 
values of YBAR5 and XBAR immediately. For simplicity, we refer to this 
variation of the model as ‘conferring’, although of course this is not intended to 
suggest actual collusion by firms. In non-conferring simulations, the new 
YBAR5 and XBAR are computed only at the end of the period. The reality is 
presumably somewhere between the two. Qualitatively, solutions obtained 
under these two variations are similar, though the non-conferring one is the 
better of the two and, accordingly, these are the results which we report below.
We also allow the first k periods of the simulation, following the initial 
random allocation of X* and Y,5, to be discarded to avoid recording any transient 
behaviour of the model. We set k at 100 in the reported results, but varying this 
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